international conflicts may spread from one nation to another in patterns that are similar to those followed by contagious diseases. Participation in war at one point in time may affect the likelihood of subsequent war participations. The French retreat from Indochina, the Middle East and Africa as one after another of its colonial possessions erupted in wars of independence may be one example of such a process. The involvement of South Africa in Angola and the intervention of both Israel and Syria in the Lebanese Civil War may be others.
Most of the analyses of the causes of war have ignored the theoretical and empirical evidence that at least some wars have significant consequences for subsequent conflicts. Only a small number of analysts have focused on the war diffusion possibility, and such work has failed to do more than scratch the surface of the problem.2 2See, for example, Richardson (1960a Richardson ( , 1960b , Singer and Small (1974) , Starr and Most (1976) , Davis, Duncan and Siverson (1976, 1978) , and Yamamoto and Bremer (1976) . Richardson (1960b) investigated whether or not wars occurred randomly through time. Singer and Small (1974) probed whether the acceptance of war leads to more war, but their analysis focused on reinforcement patterns within nations rather than on diffusion from one nation to another. Siverson and Duncan (1977) used fairly sophisticated stochastic models to examine diffusion/reinforcement processes as they affected the temporal clusters of warring dyads drawn exclusively from the international wars included in the Correlates of War data set. These studies are similar to this article and our own earlier war diffusion research, but they are also sufficiently distinct from our work that comparative evaluations are precluded. Differences in the data sets used.
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The Argument
The general war diffusion hypothesis concerns the possibility that the occurrence of one new war participation will alter the probability of subsequent occurrences. It is helpful, however, to disaggregate this general hypothesis in order to distinguish the four following diffusion-related processes:
Positive Reinforcement: The process in which the occurrence of a new war participation in a nation increases the likelihood that the same nation will experience subsequent war participations;
Negative Reinforcement: The process in which the occurrence of a new war participation in a nation decreases the likelihood that the same nation will experience subsequent war participations; Positive Spatial Diffusion: The process in which the occurrence of a new war participation in a nation increases the likelihood that other nations will experience subsequent war participations; and, Negative Spatial Diffusion: The process in which the occurrence of a new war participation in a nation decreases the likelihood that other nations will experience subsequent war participations.
in the units of analysis examined, in the ways in which distinct phenomena are hypothesized to diffuse, and in basic questions and methodologies indicate that there is very little overlap with our discussion.
That all four of these processes are related to the general war diffusion hypothesis should be clear. In each, a war experience at one point in time affects the probability of subsequent conflicts. Positive reinforcement (see path A in Figure  1 ) is a within-nation, temporal diffusion process. It is an historical possibility: A nation's decision to go to war at some time increases the probability that it will make a similar decision at some subsequent time. Positive spatial diffusion (path B in Figure 1 ) more directly entails the transfer of one nation's war behavior to other nations. The two remaining possibilities-negative reinforcement (path C) and negative spatial diffusion (path D)-are somewhat more difficult to deal with because the researcher is placed in the awkward position of trying to analyze "events" that do not occur. It is, nevertheless, entirely plausible that such processes operate. Just as the toppling of the Allende government in Chile at least temporarily led Latin Americans in other nations to forestall coup efforts of their own, a nation's own war experiences or its interpretation of the war experiences of others may discourage a nation from going to war.
Intra-Nation Reinforcement Processes
Some initial assumptions can be made about the possible linkages between a nation's own war experiences at one time and some subsequent time:
1. The decision makers in any nation are confronted by an "operational milieu" (Sprout and Sprout, 1965, p. 30 The importance of these assumptions can be demonstrated by considering Boulding's "theory of viability" (1962, Ch. 4). Focusing on zones in which a nation is dominant ("unconditionally viable") and dominated ("conditionally viable"), Boulding argues that a nation will increase its defense expenditures in an effort to expand the first area and contract the second. Decisions to arm or disarm at one time thus have some effect on a nation's zones of unconditional and conditional viability at some later time.
The point to be noted, of course, is that an armaments decision is only one factor that may alter a nation's zones of unconditional and conditional viability, and hence, its decision makers' perceptions of risks and opportunities. Similar linkages can be posited to relate a nation's recent and future war behavior. Regardless of whether a nation wins or loses an initial conflict, the conflict may have some impact on that nation's viability zones. The fighting should induce the leaders of a warring (or a recently warring) nation to reassess risks, opportunities, and policy options. This reevaluation may alter the probability that the nation will soon take up arms again.
Losing a war, for example, may shift a nation from being unconditionally viable at its home to being only conditionally viable and may result in positive reinforcement. A defeat may frustrate a nation's leaders and encourage them to avenge the loss, recoup national pride, recover lost territory, and so on by waging a subsequent conflict (e.g., Germany's reaction to World War I and the Arab nations' reaction to successive Israeli victories in the Middle East). The shift from unconditional to conditional viability could also produce a negative reinforcement effect. An initial loss might decrease the likelihood of subsequent wars by reducing a nation's fighting capacity, increasing the nation's fear of war, or persuading leaders of the futility of the war option (e.g., Japan since World War II).
A victory which shifts a nation from being conditionally viable at its home to being unconditionally viable could produce similar results. In a process of positive reinforcement, success may embolden a nation's leaders-see Blainey's (1973) notions of "confidence" and "optimism"-and thereby stimulate their entry into subsequent conflicts (e.g., Hitler at the outset of World War II or the Vietnamese and their decision to attack Kampuchea). Alternatively, an initial victory may produce negative reinforcement and decrease the likelihood of subsequent wars if leaders are satiated or the nation's dominance over some territory is secured (e.g., wars of colonial conquest and national expansion or integration).
These scenarios could be extended, of course. The Vietnam defeat clearly did not shift the United States from a state of unconditional to conditional viability at its home, for example. Nevertheless, that conflict may have had a negative reinforcement effect insofar as it apparently induced the U.S. to forego subsequent overt war participations in Angola and Ethiopia. Despite the relative simplicity of these scenarios, however, their point should be clear: Just as a nation's decision to arm at one point in time may affect that nation's risks and opportunities and hence its armaments decisions at some subsequent time, fighting a war may have similar impacts. Because a war at one time will alter the risks, opportunities, and policy options facing decision makers, the likelihood that they will decide to become involved in another conflict may also be shifted.
Inter-Nation Spatial Diffusion Processes
The possible operation of intra-nation reinforcement processes seems clear in comparison with inter-nation spatial diffusion effects. Even if a war participation by one nation alters the probability that other nations will become involved in wars, it seems unreasonable to expect that a new war participation by Cambodia, for example, would have more than a negligible impact on Bolivia's decision calculus. At a minimum, it seems more reasonable to hypothesize that if wars tend to diffuse, the process is most likely to operate among those nations that share high levels of interaction. In other words, it is plausible that spatial diffusion processes exist, but they may operate only within those groups of nations that interact most strongly rather than at the global level.
The difficulty, of course, is that nations interact with each other in different ways. Nevertheless, simple geographic proximity seems to constitute a very basic and at least initially useful basis for identifying those groups of interacting nations within which diffusion processes are most likely. Starr (1975) , and Garnham (1976) . Nations that are "close" to one another in terms of distance are likely to interact and perceive each other's conditions and behaviors as important.
Simple distance-and especially the commonly used distance between nation's capitals-may not be the most useful indicator of the interaction/ proximity concepts, however. As we have argued elsewhere (Most and Starr, 1975, 1976) , it seems preferable to operationalize the concepts on the basis of shared borders. Nations possess both non-colonial frontiers (those that exist directly between nations) and colonial borders (those that exist indirectly between nations as a result of their colonies or territorial possessions). Simple distance measures and non-colonial borders seem roughly analogous. What the distance operationalization overlooks, however, is the possibility that even distant nations may interact with one another as a result of their colonial or territorial extensions. More important, a nation that borders on a large number of other nations is faced with a potentially high risk that it may be threatened or attacked by at least some of its neighbors. At the same time, of course, nations bordering on many other nations are provided with numerous opportunities for launching attacks of their own (Starr, 1978) .
Two of the existing treatments of geographic proximity (as measured either by "short" distance or shared borders) are worthy of note. The first is Boulding's above-mentioned theory of viability (1962, Ch. 4). Boulding argues that the "power" of some entity is greatest at home and that the increases in the cost and time necessary to transport that power cause it to diminish along a "loss of strength gradient" (LSG) as the distance from home is increased. Each nation possesses some home strength in Boulding's formulation, and that strength is affected by the LSG. Hence, the LSGs of different nations overlap, thereby creating the zones of unconditional and conditional viability.
Arms races develop in Boulding's formulation because a nation that is unsatisfied either with the area in which it is dominant (its "sphere of influence") or with the area in which it is dominated begins to increase its home strength by arming. This will expand that nation's zone of unconditional viability, but at the same time it will expand the area in which neighboring nations are conditionally viable. In response, those proximate nations may also begin to arm in order to reduce their areas of uncertainty and risk. In contrast, distant nations would be less likely to perceive a threat in increasing armaments because any increases would be offset or reduced by distance.
According to Boulding's key tenet, "the further the weaker," one would expect that proximate nations would be perceived as more threatening than distant ones. Nations possessing many neighbors are given many targets or opportunities to use their power without being greatly affected by distance. At the same time, however, such nations are confronted with great risks and uncertainty because they must protect and defend themselves against many potential opponents. Nations with many close neighbors thus might seek to reduce their uncertainty by arming, by forming alliances, or by going to war.
Midlarsky's investigation (1974b, 1975) of the role of uncertainty in the occurrence of war brings one to a similar conclusion by an alternative route. In a variation of the frustration-aggression theory of violence (1975, pp. 37-38), Midlarsky argues that nations desire to reduce uncertainty, but they may be constrained from doing so even when they have the necessary capabilities. Political violence is more probable when such a nation is constrained and uncertainty not only cannot be reduced but actually grows. As Midlarsky and others hypothesize, more bordering nations may create more uncertainty by reducing control over the environment and nations may go to war to reduce uncertainty.
One should be extremely cautious in considering the relationship between borders and uncertainty. More borders may indeed contribute to increased interaction among nations, more opportunities for possible attack, greater risks of attack, and heightened levels of uncertainty, but it is unlikely that borders cause wars in a deterministic sense. It is more plausible to expect that they may -probably in combination with other factorscreate structures of risks and opportunities that constrain the range of possible inter-nation interactions and make certain types of conflictual behavior more or less likely.
The important point, however, is that each nation's structure of risks and opportunities is likely to be changed once a war is under way and these changes may be most dramatic for those nations which are proximate to the warring nations. Two nations may wage a war to reduce their own uncertainty, but the fact that they are reallocating and expending some of their "power" in the While the linkages are neither complete nor fully specified, the basic outlines of the argument should be apparent. As Boulding and Midlarsky suggest, borders do not cause wars but the more borders a nation has, 1. the greater the number of risks and opportunities that confront that nation; 2. the greater the likelihood that that nation or its colonial or extra-territorial extensions will be only conditionally viable; and 3. the greater the level of that nation's uncertainty.
If nations are conditionally viable or have high levels of uncertainty, they should have a high likelihood of:
4. arming and becoming involved in arms races; and 5. going to war.
Regardless of why a "first war" is begun, however, that initial conflict may change the world for its participants and their immediate neighbors. The warring (or recently warring) nations and the countries bordering them may find themselves confronted with changed levels of uncertainty and altered viability zones. Depending on the nature of those changes and on the willingness of the decision makers in each nation to avail themselves of the risks and opportunities presented by the altered situation, the shifts in levels of uncertainty and viability zones may induce these nations to:
6. participate in wars that they had no intention of waging in the prewar context; or 7. forego their participation in wars that they had intended to fight before the first conflict began. (Kende, 1971; Starr, 1976) . Even when allowances were made for the differences in the nations' rates of proneness to events, preliminary studies suggested that different types of conflicts may have had different propensities to diffuse.' The most important result from the pilot analyses, however, was that the diffusion problem could not be simply ignored. The theoretical argument was clearly not confirmed, but it was also quite clear that-under certain conditions-at least some war participations might not have been 4The evidence is only preliminary, but it appears at this stage that large-scale interstate wars such as those tapped by the COW list did not tend to spread during the interval. In contrast, the evidence is consistent with the hypothesis that small-scale, guerrilla and colonial conflicts (such as those that dominate the SIPRI list) may have diffused quite readily. This is merely a working hypothesis, however. Most and Starr (1975, 1976) , are shown in Figure  2B and Table 1 ). There is some convergence in these expectations, of course, making it impossible to distinguish completely between positive reinforcement and positive spatial diffusion. Similar problems will be encountered in handling the two negative alternatives. Even with these overlaps, however, the expectations are sufficiently distinct to permit at least a modest step toward distinguishing among the four processes. Figure 2B) . Of the two positive possibilities, only positive spatial diffusion can account for the patterns observed. Second, these ratios are low-4.2 percent (2 of 47) for the COW data, 13.6 percent (6 or 44) for the WR data, and 22.0 percent (9 of 41 for SIPRI-and quite clearly do not strongly support the conclusion that at least the SIPRI new war participations tended to diffuse from one nation to another during the 1946-65 period. Nevertheless, the progression from COW to WR to SIPRI in the magnitude of these ratios does once again suggest that SIPRI (rather than COW) new war participations were more-likely to diffuse.
Recent events in

The application of these procedures begins with a comparison of new war participation experiences between ten-and five-year periods
It should be emphasized, however, that neither the positive spatial diffusion nor the positive reinforcement arguments provide an accurate description of the overall patterns observed in the turnover tables. It is difficult to determine whether negative spatial diffusion or negative reinforcement provides a better accounting for those patterns, although the negative spatial diffusion possibility appears more likely. Leaving that consideration aside, however, the important point is that the Poisson/Modified Poisson procedures failed to tap such negative tendencies. This analysis indicates that nations that were at peace generally tended to remain at peace. Nations that were at war in one period may have had higher rates of proneness to subsequent new war participations, but they appear to have followed some natural "regression" toward (if not actually to) 1. That if a nation was involved in one or more wars at to, it will have been involved in even more wars at tI;and, 2. That even if a nation was not involved in any wars at to, it could still become involved in a war at tj.
COW
Negative Reinforcement
Expectation: The proportion between (a) the number of nations which participated in at least one war at to and which participated in a smaller number of wars at t1 than at to and (b) the number of nations which participated in at least one war at to approaches 1.00.
Rationale: If negative reinforcement is operative, then one would expect:
That if a nation was involved in one or more wars at to, it will have been involved in fewer wars at t1.
Negative Spatial Diffusion
Expectations:
a. The number of nations not participating in any war at to < the number of nations not participating in a war at tj; b. The ratio between (a) the number of nations which were not participating in any war at either to and t1 and (b) the number of nations not participating in any war at to approaches 1.00; and c. The ratio between (a) the number of nations which participated in at least one war at to and which participated in a smaller number of wars at t1 than at to plus those which participated in zero wars in both periods and (b) the number of nations approaches 1.00.
Rationale: If negative spatial diffusion is operative, then one would expect:
That whether a nation is at peace or at war at to, it will refrain from becoming involved in any (or as many) wars at tj.
Source: Prepared by the authors.
these codings are available in Most and Starr (1975, 1976) and Starr and Most (1976, 1978) , suffice it to say that they are based on a mutually exclusive and cumulative six-way classification scheme that taps the following types of international frontiers: If the border operationalization of the positive spatial diffusion hypothesis holds, then two expectations should be satisfied: 6These exploratory analyses focus exclusively on nations that were at peace at to. Two considerations suggest the need for such a strategy. First, if a nation is already at war, that fact is likely to influence that nation's decision calculus more strongly than the simple existence of warring border nations. Second, a focus on those nations that were at peace at to permits an investigation of positive spatial diffusion in the only area in which the expectations from that hypothesis do not overlap with expectations from the positive reinforcement argument. Thus, a focus on those nations that were at peace at any given point in time serves to maximize the likelihood that evidence of the warring border nation operationalization of the positive spatial diffusion hypothesis will be isolated. In Table 3 , the tests for these expectations are presented for the COW, WR, and SIPRI data sets. The first column denotes the appropriate to for each test. The second column identifies the fiveyear period, subsequent to to, during which new war participations were aggregated. The results of these analyses show impressive evidence in support of the border operationalization of the positive spatial diffusion hypothesis. In the 43 five-year lags examined (15 each in COW and SIPRI; 13 in WR), the inequality is not satisfied only twice. Overwhelmingly, for all three data sets, a22 > a12. In the same number of tests, the ratio dropped below .50 on only four occasions. (Of the two expectations delineated above, the ratio test is more likely not to be satisfied. The majority of the nations were always at peace. Hence, the implicit transition from peace to at least one new war participation under the condition of 0 warring border nations could carry a low probability and still cause a number of nations to make that shift.)
Perhaps the most useful summary of the test results, however, are the following comparisons of the mean transition rates: Table 3 , and so on. Even though a nation has at least one warring border nation at some point in time, it should be evident that that nation will not necessarily participate in at least one conflict during the subsequent five-year period. Like lung cancer, wars are rare events. Nevertheless, just as in the relationship between smoking and cancer, having a warring border nation does increase the odds that a subsequent new war participation will occur within five years. On the SIPRI data set, those chances are increased over three times; on the WR data set, four and a half times; and on the COW data set, nearly five times.
We have again asked the question: What would the world "look like" if there were positive spatial diffusion? This question could best be answered by focusing on a group of nations that could not also be involved in positive reinforcement, those nations that had not been at war at some given time. These nations were submitted to a "treatment" -the presence or absence of warring border nations. The possible effects of this treatment are apparent. The presence of warring border nations may have increased a peaceful nation's probability of going to war from three to five times. 
Conclusion
944
The American Political Science Review Vol. 74
The Turnover Table Analyses : The turnover tables indicated that strong negative reinforcement and! or negative spatial diffusion processes may have influenced the subsequent war behavior of those nations that experienced at least one new war participation during the initial period. Although those tendencies dominated the results in all three data sets, they were strongest in the COW set and weakest in the SIPRI data. Some evidence to support the hypothesis of positive spatial diffusion was also isolated. Although it was weak in comparison with the above-mentioned negative effects, the strength of the positive spatial diffusion appeared to increase as one moved from the COW to the WR to the SIPRI data sets. No evidence of positive reinforcement was found in any of the analyses.
The Contingency Table Analyses Clearly, further effort is required to synthesize these findings. Different types of wars appear to have different propensities to diffuse, but further exploration of this problem will require the development of new data sets that make more precise distinctions between large-and small-scale conflicts. It will be necessary to probe whether or not different types of borders tend to drive diffusion processes and whether or not major and minor power nations tend to react in similar ways to wars on their frontiers. It will be important to investigate whether warring border nations have varying impacts on nations that are themselves at peace and war. Finally, it may be of interest to consider other, non-border-related operationalizations of the general theoretical argument with a view toward exploring whether factors such as alliance partnerships, trading unions, and linguistic affinities might also define sets of interacting nations within which diffusion processes might operate.
In lieu of such additional work, however, our argument is generally supported by the existing results. War participations during the 1946-65 period do indeed seem to have altered nations' levels of uncertainty and their zones of unconditional and conditional viability. Much like arms races, wars appear to have caused leaders to reassess the situations confronting them. The evidence is consistent with the proposition that conlicts at one point in time affect leaders' decisions to participate in or refrain from subsequent wars. The evidence is weakest in the global-level stochastic modeling analyses; as predicted, it is most apparent in the examination of diffusion processes among groups of bordering nations. With only one exception, however, the analyses yield results that are consistent with the argument. The occurrence of a new war participation by one nation during the 1946-65 period did alter the probability that: (a) that same nation would experience subsequent new war participations, and (b) other nations would experience subsequent new war participations.
